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While Europe’s political leaders continue their diplomatic
dance, real power in the eurozone has shifted to central
bankers.
by Blog Admin
Since the beginning of the eurozone crisis European leaders have attended summit after
summit, which tend to result in little effective action. In light of the European Central Bank’s
recent decision to buy stricken country’s bonds, Federico Castiglioni argues that the power
to shape Europe’s financial and fiscal future may now be vested in the monetary policy of
central banks.
At the Vienna Congress of  1815, which was supposed to redraw Europe’s polit ical map,
Prince Charles de Ligne witt ily remarked: “Si le congrès dance, il ne marche pas.” If  the
Congress dances, it does not move along. He believed that the European aristocracy was showing more
interest in the gala balls of  imperial Vienna than in the painf ul responsibility to design a new polit ical order
af ter the French revolution.
Centuries have passed, but
history – especially European
history – has a tendency to
repeat itself . From the
beginning of  the Eurozone
crisis, images of  high- level
meetings, conf erences,
working lunches and dinners
appeared on the evening news.
The main participants were the
“big f our” of  the Eurozone:
Germany, France, Italy, and
Spain. The only def inite
agreement that has come out
of  this mass of  social events
is that no real agreement
exists, except the collective will to continue the subtle diplomatic dance. On economic issues, Europe does
not speak with one voice. But the dance has become important in itself . It is mandatory that one keeps
dancing with all the other heads of  state. Denying a dance to someone might result in serious annoyance.
This is true in the case of  France, the reluctant mistress of  the ball, who sometimes seems to side with her
Mediterranean neighbours and sometimes denies any allegiance to them whatsoever. France cannot decide
whether it is better to be last among the strong powers, or f irst among the weaker ones.
It is also true in the case of  Italy, which sides with Germany on questions of  f iscal austerity one day, and
courts the French with calls f or a stronger European Union the next. In the end, Italy is rebuf f ed by both
France (which f ears contagion) and by Germany (which continues to embrace the prejudice that Northern
Europe is hard working, while Southern Europe remains lazy and sunbathing).
It is true in the case of  Spain, the f irst country of  the gang of  f our to show visible cracks and is shunned by
everyone else as a result. Even Italy isn’t too keen on talking with the Spanish at the moment: it does not
require the same kind of  assistance and theref ore looks to Spain with the suspicion reserved f or a f riend
with an unexplained f ever, who wants to come over f or a visit.
Finally, there is Germany, the rich girl at the party. Chancellor Merkel does not deny anybody a dance: not to
Mariano Rajoy, the Spanish Prime Minister, who is asking f or money f rom the European Central Bank in
exchange f or better budgetary control. Not to Mario Monti, Italy’s prime minister, who insists that Europe
needs better polit ical governance. Not to François Hollande, the French president, who promotes the
tradit ional Franco-German alliance and leadership (and is caref ul to insist on precisely that order:
The Franco-German alliance).
And thus, the congress dances without really moving.
In 1815, the sudden reappearance of  Napoleon put an abrupt stop to the dancing. When the old emperor
returned f rom exile in Elba and seized power in Paris once again, f ear became the driving f orce in Vienna.
Napoleon, like today’s f inancial crisis, was a much greater threat to the European polit ical balance of
powers than any decision coming f rom meetings in Vienna could have been. Thus, career diplomats like
Metternich and Talleyrand f ound themselves in the posit ion of  having to remove all roadblocks and settle
most open problems within a f ew weeks, of ten passing over the heads of  their kings.
Is there something that could have a similar ef f ect in 2012? Evidently, neither the threat of  recession nor
rising unemployment are suf f icient to shake up the dance f loor. We have become too accustomed to
worrisome statistics and the closing of  f actories between Hamburg and Lisbon. Maybe today’s Napoleons
are the central bankers, the only ones who seem to have the will and the power to plan their moves and to
f ight on the f inancial battleground of  the Eurozone – in place of , and in spite of , national governments.
The decision of  European Central Bank President, Mario Draghi and of  the other central bankers (with the
exception of  Germany) to buy bonds of  countries with high spreads in the secondary market is a
demonstration that daring decisions are still possible. But it illustrates that polit icians and governments are
more witnesses than active players. It also demonstrates that a single centralized institution is more
powerf ul and credible – in Europe and outside Europe – than any agreement result ing f rom the dance
among two, or f our, or twenty-seven countries.
The f ounding f athers of  liberal economics thought of  central banks as weak powers that had to be
autonomous f rom polit ics to maintain independence and prevent the manipulation of  data and decision f or
polit ical advantage. They had never envisioned a situation with strong central banks and weak polit ical
power, like the Europe of  today.
In this environment, the f ight between the European Central Bank and the German Bundesbank (and
between their respective heads, Mario Draghi and Jens Weidmann) ref lects the shif t ing balance of  powers
in the eurozone. The f act that their decisions are taken with no concern about the social stability of  the
European countries, without any common course of  action f rom ECOFIN (the committee of  European
ministers of  f inance), and without any participation f rom the Barroso and Van Rompoy shows the
impotence of  institutions besides the central banks.
In the absence of  a European Finance Minister, when ministries of  f inance f ail to f ind a common view and
course of  action, the power to shape Europe’s f inancial and f iscal f uture is vested in the monetary policy
of  central banks, with each central bank inf luenced in its actions by the need to protect itself  and its own
mission. The German Central Bank is trying to avoid any hint of  inf lation – that is its main institutional
objective, while the ECB tried to prevent the f ailure of  the common currency, which would also imply the
demission of  the ECB.
Maybe all this will convince European polit icians to stop their dances and seize the polit ical init iative anew.
Right now, they seem to have passed it over to the bankers that they themselves appointed. Or maybe we,
the cit izens of  Europe, must grasp the importance of  polit ical action. While the heads of  state continue to
dance, in the splendor of  the summits in Paris or Rome, the true Europe is in the making in the f inancial
towers of  downtown Frankf urt.
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